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Enhancing Creditor Recovery
SHOULD SERVICES BE DEEMED “PROPERTY” FOR
THE PURPOSE OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW?
INTRODUCTION
On the eve of his bankruptcy filing, Warren Ruffet, who
has recently found himself in financial turmoil, gives his
neighbor some valuable investment advice. Several months
later, the lucky neighbor quadruples her wealth, cashing in five
million dollars from the sale of Warren’s stock pick.
Meanwhile, on the other side of town, Tom Jones, an
established plastic surgeon operates on a patient, who has been
badly scarred in a car accident. For personal reasons, Jones
charges the patient only ten percent of what would have been a
very expensive procedure. The operation turns out to be a
success. Some months later, Jones, burdened by several
ongoing malpractice lawsuits and rising insurance costs, files
for bankruptcy.
While factually different, the above scenarios have one
thing in common: both debtors provided services just before
their bankruptcy filings. Considering that Ruffet and Jones
are now in bankruptcy, their creditors can no longer engage in
individual collection efforts. The filing of a bankruptcy petition
operates as a temporary injunction against all collection
activities. 1 Because the bankruptcy laws prevent creditors
from pursuing individual collection efforts, as a quid pro quo, a
debtor cannot engage in creditor-harmful behavior by hiding
his assets. 2 Fraudulent transfer laws protect creditors from
1
In bankruptcy, this temporary injunction is called an automatic stay,
because it stops all creditors from collection and enforcement activities against the
debtor or his property. The automatic stay, among other things, prevents creditors
from attempting to collect any pre-bankruptcy claims or from enforcing any prebankruptcy judgments. 11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (LexisNexis 1995, Cumulative Supp. Apr.
2005 [hereinafter Supp. 2005] & Cumulative Later Case & Statutory Service Supp.
Jan. 2006 [hereinafter Supp. 2006]). Title 11 of the United States Code is commonly
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code [hereinafter, the “Code” or the “Bankruptcy Code”].
2
For example, without fraudulent transfer laws, a debtor could simply have
a friend hold on to the debtor’s valuable personal property on the eve of bankruptcy so
that the creditors do not get it. Likewise, the debtor could transfer the title to his
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such a manipulation of assets by reversing any property
transfer made by a debtor on the eve of bankruptcy that
diminishes or depletes the debtor’s estate. 3
In our hypotheticals, although Ruffet and Jones have
made their creditors worse off by providing uncompensated
services, their actions appear to be legitimate from a
fraudulent transfer law perspective. 4 This is so because
generally, the prototypical debtor defrauds his creditors by
transferring property, and not services, on the eve of
bankruptcy. 5 Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly
prohibits such kind of transfers. 6 The boundaries of fraudulent
transfer law, however, become less clear when an insolvent
debtor does not transfer any property but simply performs
uncompensated services, as Ruffet and Jones did in the above
examples. 7
Currently, under the Bankruptcy Code and existing
case law, it is unclear whether Ruffet’s or Jones’ creditors can
recover the fair market value of their services from their third
party recipients. 8 This lack of clarity stems from the fact that
fraudulent transfer law deals only with transfers of property
and not transfers of services. 9 Indeed, section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code speaks of liability in the context of transfers
house to his girlfriend with the understanding that she would transfer the title back
once the bankruptcy case was over. Both of these fraudulent transfers would deprive
the debtor’s creditors of valuable assets that they could have collected but for the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Thus, in order to avoid such asset manipulation by the
debtor at the expense of his creditors, the Bankruptcy Code provides for various
mechanisms, including preference, id. § 547 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp.
2006), and fraudulent transfer provisions, id. § 548 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 &
Supp. 2006), which serve as a check on the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior.
3
The fundamental remedy for a fraudulent transfer is to avoid, or set aside,
that transfer. Id. § 548(a). In other words, the transfer is disregarded and creditors
can recover the property itself or the value of the property from the third party. Id. §
550(a) (LexisNexis 1997).
4
If both of them had been paid for these services, their creditors would have
been entitled to that money upon the debtors’ bankruptcy filings. Eventually, the
money would have been distributed equally on a pro rata basis to same-situated
creditors. Id. § 550. Moreover, fraudulent transfer laws seek to prevent a debtor’s
transfer of property to a third party that unfairly hampers the creditor’s ability to
collect from the debtor. Id. § 548. In our two hypotheticals, neither Ruffet nor Jones
transferred any property on the eve of bankruptcy. Instead, they simply provided
services.
5
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV).
6
Id. § 541(a) (LexisNexis 1997).
7
Typically, services are defined as “[a]n intangible commodity in the form of
human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (7th ed.
1999).
8
11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a).
9
See infra discussion and accompanying notes in Part I.C.
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of property, not services. 10 However, if bankruptcy courts were
to classify services as property for the purposes of fraudulent
transfer law, then creditors would have the power to collect the
value of such services from third party recipients. Thus, the
determination of whether services should be deemed property
tests the limits of fraudulent transfer law and weighs directly
on one of the major bankruptcy policies—the maximization of
debtors’ assets for the benefit of creditors. 11
This Note addresses the question of whether services
provided by a debtor to a third party should be deemed a
transfer of property for the purpose of valuing the debtor’s
estate. 12 As it now stands, services are not property under the
traditional definition of the term. 13 Nonetheless, ending the
inquiry here seems premature. In a bankruptcy context, courts
can expand the concept of property to include services. Yet,
endorsing the blanket statement that services are always
property seems equally unsound. Considering the alreadyprevalent pro-creditor sentiment of the Bankruptcy Code, such
an approach would not only forestall the debtor’s recuperation
efforts in bankruptcy, but also would interfere with the rights
of third parties and cause them undue hardship despite their
lack of privity with creditors.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of fraudulent
transfer theory under federal and state law. Part II examines
the question of whether services should be deemed “property”
for the purposes of fraudulent transfer law. It provides an
overview of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
specifically authorizes the trustee to challenge certain
transfers deemed fraudulent. 14 Also, it explains the concept of
property as it is currently viewed under the fraudulent transfer
scheme and draws parallels to cases dealing with marital
division of assets on divorce. The marital cases provide a good
reference in this context because divorce proceedings usually
require courts to determine the value of a spouse’s services for
the purpose of dividing marital assets. Part III describes the
equitable approach used by marital courts and its application
10
See 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCE §
212 (1940) [hereinafter GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES].
11
See infra discussion and accompanying notes in Part I.A.
12
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an “estate.” The
bankruptcy estate is comprised initially of all of the debtor’s interests in property at
the time the case begins. 11 U.S.C.S. § 541.
13
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
14
11 U.S.C.S. § 548.
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in the fraudulent transfer context. As an alternative, it then
introduces the selective approach to services under the
“underlying chattel” theory. 15 The “underlying chattel” theory
argues that services should not be deemed property unless they
“culminate in transferable property.” 16 In other words, if the
performance of an uncompensated service confers a
transferable asset on its recipient, then the bankruptcy courts
should construe it as a transfer of property. 17 In contrast, if an
uncompensated service confers an intangible inalienable
benefit, then the courts should not classify such services as a
transfer of property. Part III also advances arguments for and
against considering services “property” in the fraudulent
transfer context from the debtor, creditor and third party
perspectives.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW

The modern fraudulent transfer law originated from
England’s Statute of 13 Elizabeth, passed in 1571. 18 Later, the
law continued to evolve in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act (“UFCA”), the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, and most recently,
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”). 19 Although
fraudulent transfer law has evolved, its application to modern
transactions has remained difficult due to various evidentiary
challenges. 20 The law’s response to these challenges has
15
This approach comes from the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in
American National Red Cross v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d 464, 466 (Ala.
2003). In addition, the notion of services “culminating in transferable property” has
been articulated in the context of federal estate and gift taxation. See, e.g., Comm’r v.
Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947); BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 79-81 (8th ed. 2000).
16
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17
For example, a debtor’s rendition of a service or advice to a third party may
result in the creation of a tangible asset in the hands of that party such as cash,
securities, works of art, and the like. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th
Cir. 1947); FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 15, at 79 and
accompanying notes.
18
PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS ¶ 5.01[2][a], at
5-11 (1989) “[T]he first fraudulent disposition statute in the English legal system; it
provided the model for fraudulent conveyance law in the United States and continues
to have an influence on fraudulent disposition jurisprudence.” Id. ¶ 5.01[4][d][i], at 521.
19
Id. ¶ 5.01[2][a], at 5-11.
20
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 836 (1985). “Hundreds of different
mechanisms have evolved—from net worth and accounting requirements to security
interests and default clauses—that guard against the risk of unacceptable debtor
behavior.” Id. (citing generally Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
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produced a pro-creditor shift in the way courts and legislatures
think about fraudulent transfer law. 21
Part I explores these changes, first by providing
background information on the bankruptcy process. Then, it
discusses the evolution and purpose of fraudulent transfer law
and briefly looks at two main types of fraud: actual and
constructive. Finally, it provides an overview of fraudulent
transfer law in the context of the Bankruptcy Code 22 as well as
state law models—the UFTA and the UFCA.
A.

Background and Purpose of Fraudulent Transfer Law

From the beginning, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth
condemned property transfers by the debtor who had an actual
intent “to hinder, delay, or defraud” his creditors. 23
Subsequently, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code expanded
fraudulent transfer law to include constructively fraudulent
transfers. 24 This expansion allowed for automatic application
of fraudulent transfer law whenever an insolvent debtor
transferred property for inadequate consideration. 25 Later, the
legislature further broadened the scope of the law by making
various amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. 26 The most
recent of these amendments went into effect on October 17,
2005. 27 The 2005 amendments exhibit a pro-creditor sentiment

Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977)). For an extensive overview of
these challenges posed by modern transactions, see Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the
Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 55 (1991); Baird &
Jackson, supra, at 830.
21
Williams, supra note 20, at 60, 66.
22
11 U.S.C.S. § 548 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
23
ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.01[4][d], at 5-21.
24
See id. ¶ 5.01[2][d], at 5-14.
25
Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 830.
26
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/index.htm [hereinafter
BAPCPA].
27
SHEILA M. WILLIAMS ET AL., BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 3 (2005).
Signed into law by President Bush on April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 represents the largest
overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code since its enactment in 1978. The Act seeks
to “improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility
and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for
both debtors and creditors.”
The heart of the Act’s consumer bankruptcy reforms consists of the
implementation of a “means testing” mechanism that is intended to ensure
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by focusing on protecting creditors from debtors’ abusive filing
practices and discouraging debtors’ use of bankruptcy as a
means of avoiding their obligations to creditors. 28 For example,
as of October 17, 2005, creditors can recover not only prebankruptcy assets of a Chapter 11 individual debtor but also
the assets that the individual debtor acquired after the
bankruptcy filing. 29 In contrast, before the 2005 amendments,
the debtor’s property acquired post-petition was not a part of
his bankruptcy estate and thus was not available for
Separately, the new
distribution to his creditors. 30
amendments have also lengthened the time period for an
individual debtor to obtain a bankruptcy discharge from six to
eight years. 31 In sum, the recent changes to the Bankruptcy
Code have strengthened the creditors’ power in relation to the
debtor’s bankruptcy options.
With respect to a typical bankruptcy case, when a
debtor files for bankruptcy several interesting things occur.
First, commencement of the bankruptcy case creates a
bankruptcy “estate” comprised of all of the debtor’s property at
the time of the filing. 32 The instant a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition, the debtor’s property becomes the property of the
estate, which means it no longer belongs to the debtor. 33
Property of the estate is an important concept in bankruptcy
because it allows the bankruptcy trustee to liquidate the
debtor’s nonexempt assets and to distribute those assets to

that debtors repay creditors the maximum debtors can afford. The Act also
includes provisions intended to deter serial and abusive bankruptcy filings.
Id. See also Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005:
A Section-by-Section Analysis, in THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 1-3
(2005).
28
WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 54.
29
BAPCPA § 321(a)(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C.S. § 1115 (LexisNexis Supp.
2006)). Section 1115 of the Bankruptcy Code is a new Chapter 11 business
reorganization section for cases filed by individual debtors. See WILLIAMS, supra note
27, at 107 (“The provision [§ 1115] also subjects a Chapter 11 discharge for an
individual debtor to the same exceptions from discharge that apply to Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 cases.”).
30
WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 107.
31
11 U.S.C.S. § 312(1); compare id. § 727(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2000), with id.
§ 727(a)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
32
Id. § 541(a) (LexisNexis 1997).
33
See id. Some estate property may be later returned to the debtor as
exempt property under section 522 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005) or by abandonment
under section 554 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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creditors in an organized manner. 34
Another important
consequence of the bankruptcy filing is that it creates an
“automatic stay” that stops all individual creditor collection
efforts. 35 The automatic stay functions as an injunction that
temporarily protects the debtor from all creditor actions to
collect pre-petition debts. 36 The underlying goal of this process
is to get an “honest but unfortunate debtor” back on his feet. 37
The trustee’s role in the bankruptcy proceeding is
manifold. It includes protecting the property of the estate that
has been collected for the benefit of creditors. 38 In addition,
aside from determining whether any property should be
removed from the estate and returned to the debtor as exempt
property, a trustee may avoid certain property transfers made
by the debtor in order to maximize the value of the estate
available for distribution to creditors. 39 Sections 544 through
551 of the Code provide the bankruptcy trustee with such
“avoiding powers,” 40 including the power to set aside fraudulent
transfers. 41
To understand the purposes of fraudulent transfer law,
one must look at the underlying policies of bankruptcy. As a
collective proceeding, bankruptcy enhances creditor recovery
using a presumption of equality among same-situated creditors
34
The trustee is a representative of the bankruptcy estate, id. § 323(a)
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005). See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL ¶ 6.08, at 6-48
(Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick eds., Warren, Forham & Lamont 1992).
There are several different types of trustees depending on which bankruptcy chapter
the case is filed under. See id. ¶ 6.08, at 6-49.
35
11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (LexisNexis 1995, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
36
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 1.09[1], at 1-35.
37
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
38
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 6.08, at 6-48.
39
Id. ¶ 7, at 7-3.
40
11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544-51 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
Avoiding powers are powers given to a trustee in bankruptcy to recover property
interests for the benefit of all of the debtor’s creditors. BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL,
supra note 34, ¶ 7, at 7-3. After the trustee has avoided a property interest, 11 U.S.C.S
§ 550, the transfer that created that property interest is “preserved for the benefit of
the estate,” id. § 551, and any interest in property so recovered becomes the property of
the estate, id. § 541(a)(3).
41
11 U.S.C.S. § 548. While this Note focuses on section 548, the analysis
similarly would apply to section 547, which allows the trustee to avoid preferential
transfers made shortly before the commencement of the bankruptcy case that
otherwise would allow one creditor to claim more than its fair share of the debtor’s
assets. Id. § 547. Section 547 is intended to assure equality of distribution among
same-situated creditors. BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.05, at 7-18.
See also Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725,
757 (1984) (“[P]references differ from fraudulent conveyances precisely because
preference law focuses on relationships among creditors in light of the advantages of a
collective proceeding, not on relationships between creditors and their debtor.”).
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From a creditor’s standpoint, the
as a starting point. 42
underlying goals of bankruptcy are to deal with the universe of
creditors as a whole on an equitable basis and to maximize the
value of the estate available for distribution to all creditors. 43
In contrast to bankruptcy, state collection law focuses on the
rights of an individual creditor whose motivation is to get to
the debtor’s assets before any other creditor. 44
In bankruptcy, fraudulent transfer laws allow creditors
to set aside certain transfers by debtors that undermine
creditors’ collection efforts and unfairly diminish the debtor’s
estate. 45 A debtor facing imminent economic downfall is more
likely to conceal property in an effort to defraud his creditors.
The law of fraudulent transfers seeks to prevent precisely these
types of actions. 46
B.

Actual and Constructive Fraud

There are two major types of fraudulent transfers:
actual and constructive. 47 Classic fraudulent transfer law only
dealt with the debtor who intentionally manipulated his assets
in order to keep them away from his creditors. 48 Today, actual
fraud remains the basis for avoidance of transfers under
section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and requires proof of
the subjective intention of the debtor in making a transfer. 49
For example, a debtor who gives his valuable personal property
to a friend on the eve of bankruptcy, so that the creditors do
not get it, has made an actual transfer with the “intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud [his creditors].” 50 Constructive fraud,
on the other hand, manifests itself through the presence of
certain specified facts irrespective of the actual subjective

42

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.05, at 7-18.
Jackson, supra note 41, at 728-29.
44
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 2.02, at 2-4 (“In addition, our
system of debt collection is based on “grab law” pursuant to which the first creditors to
acquire liens on the debtor’s property succeed to the detriment of the remaining
creditors who are left empty-handed.”).
45
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 275.
46
ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.01[1].
47
11 U.S.C.S. § 548; see infra notes 48, 51 and accompanying text.
48
Jackson, supra note 41, at 778 (citing Clark, supra note 20).
49
BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.06[1], at 7-58 (“The state of
mind of the debtor must be examined in order to determine whether this type of fraud
[referring to actual fraud] took place.”).
50
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(A).
43
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intention of the debtor. 51 As a result, constructive fraud serves
as “a per se rule” of avoidance in cases of alleged fraud where
there is little to no apparent evidence of actual wrongdoing. 52
Even if there is no evidence of a debtor’s misbehavior, some
transfers by their very nature make creditors worse off and are
thus facially suspect. 53 Under this rationale, constructive fraud
becomes a creditor’s remedy against the debtor. 54
C.

Current Fraudulent Transfer Laws

Today, fraudulent transfer laws are incorporated in the
Bankruptcy Code and the law of every state. 55 These laws are
not identical but they overlap in many respects. Section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code governs avoidance of fraudulent
transfers. 56 State fraudulent law can be invoked under section
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 57 In addition, individual states
follow the UFTA or the UFCA. 58 Several states, however, have
not adopted uniform or even statutory fraud laws and instead
deal with fraudulent transfer law as a matter of case law. 59
51
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B); see also GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note
10, § 275, at 471; § 294, at 510-11; & § 298, at 518.
52
Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 831; see, e.g., Philco Fin. Corp. v.
Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41 (N.D. Miss. 1971):

Courts often infer a fraudulent intention from circumstances attending a
transaction from the presence of certain well-known labels or badges of fraud.
These badges of fraud are suspicious circumstances which, if unexplained,
warrant an inference of fraud, and the more common badges of fraud were
thus enumerated in Reed v. Lavecchia, 187 Miss. 413, 193 So. 439 (1940):
“Inadequacy of consideration, transaction not in usual course or
mode of doing business, absolute conveyance as security, secrecy,
insolvency of grantor, transfer of all his property, attempt to give
evidence of fairness by conscripting sister-in-law as a conduit for
passing title to the wife, retention of possession, failure to take a
list of the property covered by the conveyance which was
commingled with some furniture and fixtures belonging to his
father’s estate, relationship of the parties, and transfer to person
having no apparent use for the property.”
Philco Fin. Corp., 335 F. Supp. at 40-41 (quoting Lavecchia, 187 Miss. at 424-25).
53
Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 831-32.
54
See id. at 831.
55
WM. MILLER COLLIER ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01[4], at 54812 (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., 15th ed. 2006).
56
11 U.S.C.S. § 548.
57
Id. § 544(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
58
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611.
59
See ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.02[1][b][i] (“Those states are in the minority,
and, in fact, will occasionally refer to the UFCA and cases decided thereunder to
resolve fraudulent disposition issues.”).
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The UFTA is in many respects similar to section 548 of
the Code. 60 While the legislature originally wanted to replace
the UFCA with the UFTA, some states, such as New York, still
use the UFCA. 61 For the most part, the drafters of the UFTA
tried to provide guidance for potential fraudulent transfer
problems in complex transactions. 62 The UFTA maintained the
original definition of an actual fraudulent transfer. 63 However,
in deciding whether a transferor received value, the UFTA,
unlike the UFCA, let go of the “good faith requirement.” 64
Furthermore, in an effort to make it more difficult to defraud
creditors, the UFTA allowed creditors extra relief against
recipients of fraudulent transfers. 65
With respect to the Bankruptcy Code, section 548 is one
of the most powerful tools available to a bankruptcy trustee
who believes that the debtor made a fraudulent transfer; the
trustee may also utilize applicable state law under the “‘strongarm’ power” 66 of section 544. 67 Section 548 is a mechanism to
police “fraud and self-dealing by a debtor at the expense of the
debtor’s creditors.” 68 Section 548(a) authorizes the trustee to
challenge fraudulent transfers made within two years before
the filing of the bankruptcy case. 69 In part, it provides:
(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that
was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the
filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer
actual intent to hinder,
which the debtor was or
such transfer was made
indebted; or

or incurred such obligation with
delay, or defraud any entity to
became, on or after the date that
or such obligation was incurred,

(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
60

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81 (McKinney 1990).
62
ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.02 [1][b][iii].
63
Id.
64
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611.
65
Id.
66
Jackson, supra note 41, at 732.
67
“The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . .” 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2005).
68
In re Feiler, 218 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000).
69
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
61
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(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation. . . . 70

On its face, the Bankruptcy Code restricts fraudulent
transfer law to a transfer of an interest in property. 71 Thus, a
creditor seeking to avoid any type of fraudulent transfer, actual
or constructive, must show that a debtor made a transfer of
property and not merely a transfer of services. 72 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines property as “the right of ownership” 73 and
defines services as “[a]n intangible commodity in the form of
human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” 74 Accordingly,
when a reasonable person thinks about property, he or she
considers “whether it can be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged, or whether it terminates on the death of
the owner.” 75 If services are something “personal to the
holder,” 76 which terminate at death and are not inheritable,
then those services have no proprietal attributes in the
traditional sense of the term. 77 Unlike Black’s Law Dictionary,
the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term property or
services. 78 As a result, this lack of definition leaves ample room
for further expansion of fraudulent transfer law. In fact, it
allows courts to maneuver on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether services should be deemed property in the fraudulent
transfer context.
II.

SHOULD SERVICES BE DEEMED PROPERTY?

Under the current Bankruptcy Code and existing case
law, it is unclear whether a debtor’s creditors can recover the

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1232.
74
Id. at 1372.
75
In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (citing In re
Marriage of Ellis (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), 538 P.2d 1347, aff’d sub nom., Ellis v. Ellis, 552
P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976)).
76
Id.
77
Id. (deciding that an M.B.A. was not “property” for purposes of dissolution
of a marriage).
78
The UFTA defines “property” as “anything that may be the subject of
ownership.” UFTA § 1(10) (1984). The comment to the UFTA further explains that
“property includes both real and personal property, whether tangible or intangible, and
any interest in property, whether legal or equitable.” Id. § 1, cmt. (10).
71
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fair market value of the debtor’s services provided to a third
party. If courts were to classify services as property for the
purpose of fraudulent transfer law, then creditors could recover
the fair market value of such services from third party
recipients. However, if courts were to leave property and
services to their traditional definitions, then the value of such
services would be out of creditors’ reach. Part II addresses
central considerations that must be taken into account when
deciding whether services should be deemed property. First, it
discusses the intricacies of fraudulent transfer law under
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Then, it describes how the
concept of property has been applied in a bankruptcy setting.
Finally, it examines the concept of property in other contexts
and considers the implications of reclassifying services as
property in the context of fraudulent transfer law.
A.

Fraudulent Transfers: An Overview of Section 548

The bankruptcy law balances debtor and creditor rights
with the goal of accomplishing an equitable allocation of
Under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
assets. 79
bankruptcy trustee may recover property for the bankruptcy
estate if (1) there was a transfer, (2) of a debtor’s interest in
property, (3) made on or within two years before the debtor’s
bankruptcy petition. 80 One of the essential elements for setting
a transfer aside under section 548(a)(1)(A) is the debtor’s
subjective fraudulent intent which can be established by
circumstantial acts. 81 On the other hand, section 548(a)(1)(B)
deals with constructively fraudulent transfers, thereby
asserting that a transfer is not constructively fraudulent if the
debtor received adequate consideration. 82

79

ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.03[2].
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a), (b) (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).
81
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.04[1], at 548-22.3; see also
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(A).
82
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(B). Unlike the UFCA, the Code’s adequate
consideration requirement does not contain a good faith component. COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.05[1][b]. However, “[a]lthough good faith is not an
element of the [Bankruptcy Code’s] section 548(d)(2) definition of ‘value’, the bad faith
of a transferee may still result in the setting aside of a transfer if the transferee’s bad
faith can be imputed to the transferor so that the transferor actually intended ‘to
hinder, delay, or defraud’ creditors.” Id. For the purposes of section 548, “‘value’
means property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor
or to a relative of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(d)(2)(A).
80
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Thus, to determine whether a fraudulent transfer has
occurred, courts must address several issues.
First, a
bankruptcy trustee who is seeking to avoid any type of
fraudulent transfer must prove that a “transfer” has occurred.
The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” in section 101(54) as
“each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with (i)
property, or (ii) an interest in property.” 83 The court must also
determine the time of the transfer since a fraudulent transfer
may only be set aside if it “was made or incurred on or within 2
years before the date of the filing of the petition.” 84 Once a
party seeking to invalidate the transfer proves that a “transfer”
was made, it also has to show that the transfer involved the
debtor’s “property.” 85 However, unlike the term “transfer,”
bankruptcy law does not provide for an exhaustive or uniform
understanding of the term “property.” 86 In searching for the
meaning of this term, courts often refer to “commercial sense
and pertinent state law property concepts.” 87
B.

The Concept of Property in Bankruptcy

The Statute of Elizabeth limited the concept of property
to tangible assets. 88 Today, however, creditors can recover
tangible or intangible property. 89
In order to maximize
creditors’ remedies, the courts have breathed elasticity into the
term “property.” 90 Generally, it includes “anything of value,
anything which has debt paying or debt securing power.” 91 In
Segal v. Rochelle, the Supreme Court explained that the
purpose of construing the term “property” broadly is
to secure for creditors everything of value the [debtor] may possess
in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition. To this end,
the term ‘property’ has been construed most generously and an

83

11 U.S.C.S. § 101(54).
Id. § 548(a)(1). But see the new § 548(e)(1), which provides a trustee with
a ten year limitation period to avoid a debtor’s transfer made “to a self-settled trust or
similar device.” Id.
85
Id.
86
See discussion infra Part II.B. and accompanying notes.
87
ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 6.02[1][b].
88
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 135.
89
Id. § 138.
90
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); In re Lewis W. Shurtleff, Inc.,
778 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).
91
Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443 (1901).
84
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interest is not outside creditors’ reach just because it is novel or
contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed. 92

While the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a
definition of property, it also does not explicitly exclude
services from being classified as property. Although this
decision is ultimately left to judicial analysis and
interpretation, the lack of any definition leaves courts to many
interpretive possibilities. The very fact that the traditional
concepts of property and services are dissimilar at first glance
may allow courts to recognize overarching interpretations
when analyzing these concepts. Currently, however, there is
little case law dealing with the question of whether services
could be considered property in the fraudulent transfer context.
Accordingly, marital law cases offer some relevant examples.
C.

Property in Other Contexts: Learning From Marital Law
Cases

In marital cases, courts have often crossed the bridge
from the traditional definition of property to a more liberal
construction of an asset in question in order to achieve an
equitable result. 93 For example, courts have viewed a medical
degree or a celebrity’s career as property eligible for equitable
In the decisions that follow, the judicial
distribution. 94
perception of marital property invariably stems from the view
that the institution of marriage is “an economic partnership.” 95
As such, it involves a specific exchange of tangible and
intangible resources, which must be accounted for upon
divorce. 96 In adopting an equitable approach to such an
analysis, the courts ultimately move away from formal or
traditional definitions of property in order to include such

92

Segal, 382 U.S. at 379.
Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Md. 1985).
94
See discussion infra notes 97-130 and accompanying text. Marital property
is defined broadly as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of
a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held.” O’Brien v. O’Brien,
489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1985).
95
Forcucci v. Forcucci, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (App. Div. 1981) (“The
Equitable Distribution Law was enacted as the result of a growing realization that the
marriage relationship is also an economic partnership and that when a marriage ends
there should be some comprehensive and fair approach to the economic incidents of
divorce.”).
96
Id.
93
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intangible assets like professional degrees and careers under
the property umbrella.
To begin, in O’Brien v. O’Brien, 97 the New York Court of
Appeals held that a husband’s medical degree obtained during
his marriage could be marital property subject to equitable
distribution upon divorce. 98 In that case, the parties were
married for almost ten years. 99 During that period, the couple’s
efforts were primarily focused on obtaining the husband’s
medical degree. 100 In fact, while the husband was in the
process of obtaining his medical degree, the wife worked to
support both of them instead of pursuing her permanent
teaching certification. 101 After completing his undergraduate
degree and premedical requirements, the O’Briens relocated to
Guadalajara, Mexico, where Mr. O’Brien attended medical
school. 102 During this time, Mrs. O’Brien continued to work to
support them financially. 103 The parties later returned to New
York so that Mr. O’Brien could complete his degree program
and internship. 104 Two months after Mr. O’Brien received his
license to practice medicine, he filed for divorce. 105
At the divorce proceeding, Mr. O’Brien argued that his
medical degree was not property but rather a “personal
attainment in acquiring knowledge.” 106 The Court of Appeals
disagreed explaining that traditional common law property
doctrine does not constrain the definition of marital property. 107
Indeed, the court reasoned that although a degree does not
render itself to “sale, assignment or transfer,” it still might be
“property” under the New York divorce statute. 108 In the
court’s opinion, the New York statutory law with respect to
marital property easily accommodated inclusion of a medical
degree. 109 Further, the court noted that the statute’s economic
partnership theory required classification of career assets as
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 713.
See id. at 713-14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 714.
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 717 (“That a professional license has no market value is irrelevant.”).
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715.
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marital property subject to equitable distribution. 110 In sum,
the O’Brien court, through the use of equity and with the goal
of doing justice for the suffering spouse, went beyond the
traditional definition of property in order to enlarge the marital
estate.
Hence, in Golub v. Golub, 111 a New York trial court held
that a spouse’s celebrity career, similar to a professional
degree, represents marital property upon divorce. 112 In Golub,
a famous actress and model, Marisa Berenson, married an
established attorney. 113 After four and a half years of marriage,
the couple divorced. 114 Throughout the marriage, Ms. Berenson
was focused on advancing her career. 115 She spent a lot of time
abroad, during which time Mr. Golub took care of their home. 116
At the divorce proceeding, Mr. Golub argued that the increase
in value of his spouse’s acting and modeling career was marital
property, subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 117 The
court sided with Mr. Golub, rejecting Ms. Berenson’s
arguments “that her celebrity status is neither ‘professional’
nor a ‘license’ and hence not an ‘investment in human capital
subject to equitable distribution.’” 118 In deciding the issue, the
court referred to O’Brien v. O’Brien, in which the Court of
Appeals held that a professional license constituted marital
property. 119 The Golub court concluded that “[t]he O’Brien
remedy should be applied evenhandedly to all spouses,”
professional and nonprofessional alike, 120 justifying its decision
by the need to avoid “an economic windfall to some and an

110

Id. at 716. The court stated:

The Legislature has decided, by its explicit reference in the statute to the
contributions of one spouse to the other’s profession or career, that these
contributions represent investment in the economic partnership of the
marriage and that the product of the parties’ joint efforts, the professional
license, should be considered marital property.
Id.
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
Id. at 950.
Id. at 947.
Id.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
Id. at 949.
489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying

text.
120

Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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unfair deprivation to others.” 121 The court noted that marital
property should not be constrained to “licenses enumerated in
the Education Law.” 122 It further held that “the skills of an
artisan, actor, professional athlete or any person whose
expertise in his or her career has enabled him or her to become
an exceptional wage earner should be valued as marital
property subject to equitable distribution.” 123
In another case, Elkus v. Elkus, a famous opera singer,
Frederica von Stade, filed for divorce after a seventeen-year
marriage. 124 During the course of the marriage, Ms. von Stade
reached the apex of her career. 125 Her husband alleged that he
contributed to his wife’s success, and therefore, her career
should be shared as marital property. 126 The appellate court
agreed with Mr. Elkus, holding that under the New York
definition, “things of value acquired during marriage are
marital property even though they may fall outside the scope of
traditional property concepts.” 127 The court further stated that
“[t]he statutory definition of marital property does not mandate
that it be an asset with an exchange value or be salable,
assignable or transferable.” 128 Thus, the court found no reason
why it could not extend the O’Brien rule to a celebrity career.
The Elkus court followed Golub’s reasoning, noting that
“[t]here is no rational basis upon which to distinguish between
a degree, a license, or any other special skill that generates a
Therefore, because defendant
substantial income.” 129
contributed to the advancement of Ms. von Stade’s career, such
advancement constituted marital property. 130
In the marital context, because courts recognize that the
supporting spouse suffers inequity and unfairness upon
divorce, the courts choose to even the score between the
spouses by declaring intangible assets such as professional
degrees and celebrity careers to be marital property. 131 This
121

Id.
Id. at 949.
123
Id. at 950.
124
572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
125
Id. at 902.
126
Id.
127
Id. (citing O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985)).
128
Id. at 902.
129
Id. at 904.
130
Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
131
See, e.g., O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716-17 (noting that it is “unfair not to
consider the license a marital asset” in light of the fact that “[w]orking spouses are
122
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inequity is especially acute where the supporting spouse
purposely puts the development of his or her own career on
hold. By analogy, a creditor, like a supporting spouse, also
suffers inequity and unfairness when a debtor breaks his
contractual obligations and leaves his creditor empty-handed.
In the fraudulent transfer context, this inequity manifests
itself where the debtor purposely transfers assets on the eve of
bankruptcy so that his creditors get nothing. Thus, the
equitable analysis employed by the marital courts may also be
applied to the concept of services in the bankruptcy context.
Specifically, instead of being bound by the traditional concepts
of property, bankruptcy courts can choose to construe the term
“property” in such a way as to include services under its
umbrella. This approach would maximize the value of the
debtor’s estate, thus providing a powerful remedy to the
debtor’s creditors. Otherwise, if services cannot be considered
property, it might allow disinterested debtors to manipulate
the bankruptcy process in order to deprive creditors of a
valuable asset.
As the above examples demonstrate, from time to time,
courts do assign property-like characteristics to services. 132
And if disputes are to be resolved with respect to services,
reference to property law second to contract law 133 would
probably be most helpful. However, not every fraudulent
transfer case involving services should be subject to
propertization. Instead, bankruptcy courts should selectively
recognize only certain attributes of services as property.
Through this selective approach, courts can achieve the
underlying bankruptcy goals without infringing on the debtor’s
rights or the rights of third parties.
III.

A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO THE UNION OF SERVICES AND
PROPERTY

Services should not be deemed property in the
fraudulent transfer context unless such services “culminate in

often required to contribute substantial income as wage earners, sacrifice their own
educational or career goals and opportunities for child rearing, perform the bulk of
household duties and responsibilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that
could have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed rather than
occupied with the study and training necessary to acquire a professional license”).
132
See supra Part II.C.
133
Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 835-36.
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transferable property.” 134 Accordingly, the equitable approach
to defining property used by marital courts, as illustrated in
Part II.C., may not be appropriate in all fraudulent transfer
situations.
Considering that there is no real check on
overexpansion of what is to be considered property due to lack
of precise definitions, any attempt to liberally apply fraudulent
transfer law to services can create a dangerous precedent. For
example, application of the equitable approach would be
inappropriate in our Jones hypothetical because the “asset” at
issue, i.e., the health benefit to the patient, is unquantifiable.
Therefore, courts should be selective in classifying services as
property in the fraudulent transfer context.
Part III discusses specific fraudulent transfer situations
where the equitable approach may be appropriate for resolving
fraudulent transfers. In addition, it explains the “underlying
chattel” theory through case law and contrasts it with the
equitable approach. Finally, it concludes that all services
cannot be simply classified as property and argues for an
application of a selective approach to services in the fraudulent
transfer context.
A.

The Union of Services and Property

Expanding the formal definition of property to services
under the equitable approach may be justified in transfers
made with actual fraudulent intent, as opposed to constructive
intent. Indeed, where a debtor is intentionally trying to delay
or hinder his creditors’ ability to collect on the owed debt, the
chances are that the debtor and the third party are not entirely
blameless. For example, Picasso may agree to paint the
neighbor’s picture on the eve of bankruptcy with the
understanding that the neighbor will pay Picasso for the
portrait once Picasso is out of bankruptcy. In such a case, the
court should be able to view Picasso’s services as property
regardless of whether a contractual agreement can be proven,
and recover the painting from the neighbor for the benefit of
creditors. 135 However, in a constructively fraudulent scenario,
134

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code includes in the property of the estate
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.” 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1997). Thus, if it can be established that
Picasso and the neighbor entered into a contract before Picasso’s filing of bankruptcy,
the neighbor’s subsequent payment would become property of the estate based on the
contractual obligation.
135
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where a debtor provides uncompensated services without any
intent to defraud his creditors, the use of the equitable
approach is too overreaching and may allow creditors to get a
windfall at the expense of an innocent third party.
Therefore, as an alternative to the equitable approach,
bankruptcy courts should include services under the property
umbrella only if the services “culminate in transferable
property.” 136 Instructive on this point is American National
Red Cross v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, 137 in which the
Supreme Court of Alabama looked to the underlying nature of
the service—as chattel—to conclude that it constituted
property for the purpose of fraudulent transfer law. 138 In that
case, the court held that blood products qualify as “property”
under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(AUFTA), even though the Alabama’s Uniform Commercial
Code specifically termed “the act of procuring and furnishing
the blood products” to be a service. 139 In ASD Specialty
Healthcare, the plaintiff’s cause of action arose from a contract
it had with the defendants. 140 This contract concerned sale of
blood products. 141 As one of its allegations, the plaintiff
contended that one of the defendants engaged in conduct which
violated AUFTA. Specifically, the conduct involved transfer of
blood products. 142 In rebuttal, the defendants argued that the
statute was not applicable since “the blood products in question
are considered, for all purposes, to be a ‘service’ under the
[Alabama’s Commercial Code] and, therefore, not ‘property’
under the AUFTA.” 143 Indeed, Alabama’s Uniform Commercial
Code provided in part that:
Procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using
human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, and
other human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs for the
purpose of injecting, transfusing, or transplanting any of them in the
136
“The purpose of the [Alabama Uniform Transfer Act] is to prohibit
fraudulent transfers of property by a debtor who intends to defraud creditors by
placing assets beyond their reach.” Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow
Co., 839 So. 2d 629, 632 (Ala. 2002).
137
888 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 2004).
138
Id. at 466.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 465.
141
Id.
142
Id. “A default judgment has previously been entered against LA
Pharamceutical and Peter Woolley, neither of which are defendants in this current
action.” Id.
143
ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d at 465.
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human body is declared for all purposes to be the rendition of a
service by every person participating therein and whether any
remuneration is paid therefore is declared not to be a sale of such
whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, or other
human tissues. 144

Referencing the statute, the Alabama Supreme Court
agreed with the plaintiff that blood products were property for
purposes of AUFTA, explaining that “the act of procuring and
furnishing the blood products—not the blood products
themselves”—constituted a service in this instance. 145 The
court distinguished between “the act of procuring and
furnishing blood products” and the underlying blood products
themselves, thereby concluding that since blood products can
be owned, they are property for purposes of AUFTA. 146
Although the state statute in ASD Specialty Healthcare
defined furnishing of blood as a service, the court looked to the
“underlying chattel” nature of this service in order to conclude
that the transfer was, after all, the transfer of property and
thus subject to fraudulent transfer law. 147 Just like the ASD
Specialty Healthcare case, our earlier hypotheticals illustrate
the “underlying chattel” approach. Recall that Warren Ruffet’s
neighbor quadrupled her wealth as a result of Ruffet’s free
investment advice. Hence, Ruffet’s uncompensated services
should justifiably become property of his bankruptcy estate
available for distribution to creditors; since the service itself
cannot be recovered from a practical standpoint, a creditor can
recover the underlying property of that service or the money
from the sale of stock. Similarly, and even more to the point,
Picasso, who paints a portrait for his neighbor for free, has
given his neighbor a wealth-producing piece of property, while
depriving his own creditors of a valuable asset. Although the
act of painting constituted a service, the painting itself is
144

ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (LexisNexis 2002).
ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d at 466.
146
Id. at 466. However, the dissenting Justices noted that the transaction at
issue should not be considered “property” under AUFTA for several reasons. First,
Justice Lyons refused to focus exclusively on the nature of the blood products apart
from the acts of procuring or furnishing blood products in light of the “all purposes”
language of the statute. Id. at 467 (Lyons, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Houston
distinguished between the actual rendition of a service, which cannot be the subject of
ownership and service contracts, which like property, can be owned. Id. at 470
(Houston, J., dissenting from denial of application for rehearing). Third, Justice
Houston also argued that once Woolley had distributed the blood products to the
defendants, the service was complete and could not be transferred or be the subject of
ownership. Id.
147
Id. at 466 (majority opinion).
145
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property. Thus, even if the neighbor subsequently sold the
painting to someone else, creditors should be able to recover
the full value of the painting from the neighbor.
In both of these instances, the “underlying chattel”
theory would force the neighbors to disgorge to the bankruptcy
trustee the fair market value of services that they have
received. This conclusion springs from the well-established
rationale behind constructively fraudulent transfers for
inadequate consideration: that the debtor has a moral duty to
give priority to his legal obligations, i.e., his creditors, before
attending to his own or anyone else’s interests. 148 In short, a
fraudulent transfer is a “wrong” against creditors. 149
In contrast to the Ruffet and Picasso hypotheticals,
however, it is difficult to imagine how Tom Jones’ services
could be deemed property for the purposes of fraudulent
transfer law.
This is because Jones’ services lack the
“underlying chattel” quality in the sense that they did not
result in transferable property. Indeed, Jones simply restored
his patient’s physical appearance and well-being. Hence, while
Ruffet’s business acumen and Picasso’s skill “culminated in
transferable property” that can be valued, Jones’ services
resulted in a health benefit, which is impossible to quantify. 150
The conventional wisdom regards a person’s health as
priceless. Moreover, while Ruffet and Picasso can actually
retrieve the product or the proceeds of their services from their
neighbors, Jones cannot go back and demand the return of the
patient’s restored physical appearance and well-being. 151
As the above examples illustrate, the line between
services and property gets more distorted as one distinguishes
between tangible and intangible benefits. Generally, a person’s
uncompensated services may “culminate” in significant
economic advantage to the recipient, a valuable non-economic
benefit, or even both. But why should a recipient of a wealthproducing service be forced to disgorge the fair market value of
the benefit received, while the recipient of a non-economic
benefit should not? Perhaps the chances of fraud are higher

148
Clark, supra note 20, at 510-11. “The ideal can be captured by a cliché: be
just before you are generous.” Id. at 510.
149
Id.; see also John C. McCoid II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances:
Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 639, 656 (1983).
150
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
151
Here, we are not concerned with other means of collecting from the patient,
i.e., recovery of fair market value of the surgery performed.
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where a debtor has wealth-producing abilities but directs such
abilities toward third parties instead of his creditors. In
bankruptcy, creditors should take priority over the residue of
the debtor’s assets because it is only fair that they get
something back for what they originally gave to the debtor. 152
Thus, the contractual nature of the debtor-creditor relationship
justifies the conclusion that a recipient of services which
“culminate in transferable property” should be forced to
disgorge the benefit for the sake of the debtor’s creditors.
B.

A Selective Approach: The “Underlying Chattel” Theory

The “underlying chattel” approach supports our Ruffet
and Picasso hypotheticals without posing any subjective
inquiry difficulties or valuation problems in the fraudulent
transfer context. Surely, so long as services “culminate in
transferable property,” such property can be fairly valued and
the transfer can be avoided under fraudulent transfer law. 153
Without question, most creditors would welcome the
“underlying chattel” theory in the fraudulent transfer context,
especially because an insolvent debtor is often uninterested in
maximizing assets for his creditors’ benefit. In fact, “after a
debtor has borrowed money, his interests conflict with those of
his creditors.” 154 Therefore, the “underlying chattel” approach
may provide creditors with assurance that they would get what
they bargained for with the debtor.
At the same time, courts should not include services
that do not “culminate in transferable property” under a
“broad” definition of property. 155 For one, from a debtor’s
perspective, equating services with property may have drastic
implications. Current fraudulent transfer law is designed to be
Thus, in a case of an innocent debtor,
pro-creditor. 156
fraudulent transfer law opens itself up to the possibility of

152

Garrard Glenn, The Diversities of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in
Bankruptcy History, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 525 (“The whole presupposition of the rules
against fraudulent conveyances is that from the time a debtor knows that he is
insolvent he holds all his property subject to the interests of his creditors.” (quoting In
re Salmon, 239 Fed. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.))).
153
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
154
Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 833.
155
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
156
Jackson, supra note 41, at 783. “[T]he [existing fraudulent] conveyance
statutes generally focus on conveyances by the debtor, not on unilateral actions taken
by creditors (such as foreclosure sales).” Id. at 783 n.184.
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abuse by creditors. 157 Even though the main purpose of
fraudulent transfer law is to prevent a debtor from defrauding
his or her creditors, it is possible for creditors to enrich
themselves through the machinery of fraudulent transfer
law. 158 Sewer service 159 is just one of many examples of
creditors’ unethical behavior. Thus, if courts were to start
equating services with property in fraudulent transfer cases,
an already vulnerable debtor would be placed at a
disadvantage.
Specifically, a debtor’s ability to find or
maintain a job may be impaired as a result. For example, an
employer, upon checking a potential employee’s credit and
finding that it is less than perfect, may be hesitant to extend
an employment offer to the debtor. Indeed, the employer may
be wary of potential liability for additional payments to
employee’s creditors for the services provided, if the debtor files
for bankruptcy. Moreover, an employee debtor may have less
negotiating power with respect to his job. For example, if the
debtor prefers to take a smaller pay in exchange for other
benefits like a reduced hour schedule or a chance to work from
home, the debtor’s inability to do so may lead to issues of
indentured servitude for the sake of creditors. 160 The employer
may refuse to honor the employee’s request simply because a
bankruptcy trustee may later come after the employer for the
full payment of the employee’s services. Alternatively, it may
discourage debtors from being productive in society upon
realization that performance of uncompensated services may
actually cost money to their service recipients.
Another reason for services not to be classified as
property is that, if services are considered property, creditors
may get more than they are entitled to at the expense of third
party recipients.
The basic principle behind fraudulent
conveyance law is that creditors are prejudiced only by a
transfer of an interest in property that actually belonged to the
debtor and which would have been available to creditors

157

Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 780.
159
Sewer service is defined as “[t]he fraudulent service of process on a debtor
by a creditor seeking to obtain a default judgment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 7, at 1372.
160
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 212. “We have seen
that the debtor’s labour is not an asset for his creditors, since otherwise our law would
sanction slavery.” Id.
158
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outside of bankruptcy. 161
If the debtor chose to provide
uncompensated services that is the debtor’s choice, and the
extra money that the debtor chose not to receive should not be
available for creditors since the debtor would have never had
that money to begin with. Surely, performance of services by
the debtor is generally not a transfer of the debtor’s interest in
property because the resulting benefit to the third party
typically would not become an estate asset and thus would not
be available for distribution to creditors. 162 Furthermore,
creditors are often sophisticated parties who can protect
themselves by either not lending or in the alternative, charging
an even higher interest rate. Thus, fraudulent transfer law
should not give creditors an additional advantage, especially
when the debtor is already in a vulnerable situation.
Aside from a debtor perspective, there are significant
third party issues here as well. For example, a third party
recipient may not even know that the debtor is about to file
bankruptcy; yet, by simply accepting the service, the third
party recipient subjects itself to the bankruptcy court’s
discretion. How much emphasis should a court place on the
actual prejudicial effect of the transaction on a third partytransferee? Perhaps one can accept that Ruffet’s and Picasso’s
neighbors would have to disgorge the benefit received,
especially since they have paid very little for it. In that
respect, Ruffet’s and Picasso’s creditors may be able to use a
constructive trust remedy to cure the unjust enrichment. 163
Indeed, whenever one, innocently or not, obtains title to
property that results in unjust enrichment, courts may declare
that such a title-holder is the trustee of a trust, whose sole duty
is to transfer the title and possession to the beneficiary. 164
Here, Ruffet’s and Picasso’s neighbors did not pay for the
property which they acquired through these services. In this
161
See ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 6.02[1][b], at 6-4 to -5. “Equitable distribution
of a debtor’s estate is compromised by transactions that divest the debtor of property
that would otherwise be available to satisfy the claims of the debtor’s general
creditors.” Id.
162
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 212.
163
“Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity whenever title to
property is found in one who in fairness should not to be allowed to retain it.” GEORGE
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS, § 77, at 286 (6th ed. 1987). Constructive trust is not an express
trust but a judicial fiction created to rectify fraud. Id. § 77, at 287. In that respect, “[i]t
is not a trust in which the trustee . . . ha[s] duties of administration . . . , but rather
[the trust is] a passive, temporary trust, in which the trustee’s sole duty is to transfer
the title and possession [of property] to the beneficiary.” Id.
164
Id. § 77, at 286.
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instance, courts can force them to disgorge the benefits in favor
of the debtors’ creditors. Under the constructive trust remedy,
courts would consider third party recipients to be trustees and
order them to transfer title and possession to the beneficiaries,
i.e., the debtors’ creditors. 165 The reason the constructive trust
remedy is available to creditors here is because Ruffet’s and
Picasso’s services created tangible property. Generally, “[a]
constructive trust must have definite subject matter, just as an
express trust must meet this requirement.” 166
However, creditors cannot use the constructive trust
remedy with respect to Jones’ patient. Recall that Jones
conferred a health benefit on his patient as opposed to
property. Without question, it is difficult to accept that Jones’
patient, who now may have a chance to lead a normal life,
should be liable to Jones’ creditors. Not only is it illogical to
conclude that Jones unjustly enriched his patient, but it is also
impractical to demand disgorgement of this benefit. If an
innocent third party can be made to pay to the debtor’s
creditors for such an unquantifiable benefit, it is then the third
party, not the debtor, who would feel the wrench of
bankruptcy. 167 Surely, Jones’ patient did not bargain for such
an outcome.
Separately, while the debtor-creditor relationship is
typically based on contract, the contractual nature is not
present between creditors and third party recipients. 168 Due to
this lack of privity, the bankruptcy courts should not look to
the third party in order to make the debtor’s creditors whole.
Indeed, the law governing the debtor-creditor relationship did
not intend for a creditor to subject a third party to a fraudulent

165

Id.
Id. at 288.
167
McCoid, supra note 149, at 657-58. “[T]ransferees, not debtors, bear the
brunt of invalidation of fraudulent conveyances.” Id. at 658.
168
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 140.
In his
discussion of creditor rights with respect to debtor’s services, Glenn points out:
166

True, the person for whom the debtor gratuitously laboured has been
enriched, as may be seen in the enhanced value of the property upon which
the efforts were expended. But the legislation in which we are interested was
never intended to bring creditor and third party into a quasi-contractual
relation generally. The inquiry is, what asset, if any, has the debtor
transferred to the third party? In the case of gratuitous labor, the answer
must be that no asset has passed; hence the creditor cannot subject the third
party to any claim under the statutes.
Id.
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transfer claim. 169 From a practical standpoint, analyzing third
party transactions would probably require courts to return to
subjective intent considerations. For example, courts may have
to analyze whether the third party was “innocent” or whether
he or she knew exactly what was going on when he or she
accepted the services from the debtor. However, under the
selective approach, the inquiries into the third party’s psyche
are unnecessary. Regardless of whether the third party knew
of the debtor’s motivations to file for bankruptcy, it would have
to disgorge the value of the services received if the services
Under this
“culminated into transferable property.” 170
approach, because tangible benefits have clearly assignable
values, creditors can easily recover assets under the
constructive trust remedy, without any practical difficulties.
Considering that the historical progression of
fraudulent transfer law has been toward development of
objective criteria, 171 courts should be disinclined to classify all
services as property for the sake of judicial efficiency. In that
respect, the selective approach to the joinder of services and
property limits the potential abuse and misapplication of
fraudulent transfer law, while providing creditors with a
workable remedy.
CONCLUSION
The concept of fraud is difficult to pigeonhole into one
set of rules. On the one hand, leaving the term property to its
traditional meaning undermines the Code’s underlying policy
of enhancing creditors’ recovery. On the other hand, classifying
all services as property expands a creditor’s advantage at the
debtor’s and third party’s expense. As this Note demonstrates,
however, a selective approach to this inquiry could still fulfill
bankruptcy goals without sacrificing judicial efficiency and
equitable treatment of the parties involved.
Through the selective approach, bankruptcy courts can
achieve the mission of protecting the debtor’s assets for
creditors without reducing fraudulent transfer law to a profitgenerating tool. Indeed, if a debtor possesses skills that can
169

Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 835-36.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
171
ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.02 (stating that “[c]ourts have trouble reaching
reliable conclusions regarding subjective matters; therefore there was a need to
objectify fraudulent disposition law”).
170
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produce an economic benefit, he should direct his efforts to
using those skills to pay off his creditors, as opposed to
rendering potential economic benefit on third parties. Such
debt collection is fair in light of the fact that the debtor did not
live up to his debtor-creditor bargain. But at the same time,
courts should not allow creditors to reap profits from all third
party recipients. Hence, if a debtor applies his skill to confer a
non-economic benefit, creditors should not use such a third
party recipient as an outlet to fulfill the debtor’s bankruptcy
obligations.
After all, fraudulent transfer laws are
implemented to promote not just honesty in the debtor’s
dealings with creditors but also to promote honesty among
creditors.
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